Während seiner langjährigen Tätigkeit als Facharzt für Psychiatrie am Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust hat der Autor dieses Beitrags die Entwicklung der Gesundheitsfürsorge von Kindern mit Geschlechtsidentitätsstörung (»gender dysphoria«) aus nächster Nähe beobachtet. Der Beitrag entwickelt einige Hypothesen zu den soziokulturellen Faktoren für den plötzlichen, sprunghaften Anstieg der Zahl minderjähriger Patienten, bei denen Geschlechtsidentitätsstörungen diagnostiziert und die dann zur medikamentösen und operativen Geschlechtsumwandlung an spezialisierte Zentren überwiesen wurden, und schildert charakteristische Denkverbote in diesem Zusammenhang. Die beruflichen Bedingungen, die seinen (...) Text beeinflussten, und die weiteren Entwicklungen in der Tavistock-Klinik wie auch in seinem eigenen Leben erläutert der Autor schließlich in einem nachstehenden Kommentar zu seinem eigenen Text. (shrink)

Aldehyde dehydrogenase 2 (ALDH2) deficiency constitutes one of the most common hereditary enzyme deficiencies, affecting 35% to 40% of East Asians and 8% of the world population. It causes the well-known Asian Alcohol Flush Syndrome, characterized by facial flushing, palpitation, tachycardia, nausea, and other unpleasant feelings when alcohol is consumed. It is also associated with a marked increase in the risk of a variety of serious disorders, including esophageal cancer and osteoporosis. Our recent studies with murine models have demonstrated that (...) a one-time administration of an adeno-associated virus (AAV) gene transfer vector expressing the human ALDH2 coding sequence (AAVrh.10hALDH2) will correct the deficiency state and prevent alcohol-induced abnormalities of the esophagus and bone. If successful in humans, such strategy would reduce the increased risk-associated disorders such as esophageal cancer and osteoporosis, but also prevent the Asian Alcohol Flush Syndrome. This treatment thus raises ethical concerns: although it would potentially prevent fatal disease, it could also allow affected individuals to drink alcohol without suffering the Asian Alcohol Flush Syndrome and, hence, potentially enable personal destructive behavior. Here we explore the ethical arguments against the development of a gene therapy for ALDH2 deficiency and we find them wanting. We contend that development of such treatments is ethically appropriate and should be part and parcel of the solutions offered against the condition. (shrink)

advanced directivesend-of-life decisionsharming the deadposthumous reproductiontransplant ethics.

Several recent anti-obesity campaigns appear to embrace stigmatization of obese individuals as a public health strategy. These approaches seem to be based on the fundamental assumptions that (1) obesity is largely under an individual’s control and (2) stigmatizing obese individuals will motivate them to change their behavior and will also result in successful behavior change. The empirical evidence does not support these assumptions: Although body weight is, to some degree, under individuals’ personal control, there are a range of biopsychosocial barriers (...) that make weight regulation difficult. Furthermore, there is accumulating evidence that stigmatizing obese individuals decreases their motivation to diet, exercise, and lose weight. Public health campaigns should focus on facilitating behavioral change, rather than stigmatizing obese people, and should be grounded in the available empirical evidence. Fundamentally, these campaigns should, first, do no harm. (shrink)

Aggressive therapies and the manipulation of life are now commonly applied to children, often including neonates and children who cannot express their consent. This text discusses a range of bioethical dilemmas concerning children and medicine.

The principle of non-maleficence, primum non nocere, has deep roots in the history of moral philosophy, being endorsed by John Stuart Mill, W. D. Ross, H. L. A. Hart, Karl Popper and Bernard Gert. And yet, this principle is virtually absent from current debates on social justice. This article suggests that non-maleficence is more than a moral principle; it is also a principle of social justice. Part I looks at the origins of non-maleficence as a principle of ethics, (...) and medical ethics in particular. Part II introduces the idea of non-maleficence as a principle of social justice. Parts III and IV define the principle of justice as non-maleficence in terms of its scope and coherence, while Part V argues that the motivation of not doing harm makes this principle an alternative to two well-established paradigms in the literature on social justice: justice as mutual advantage (David Gauthier) and justice as impartiality (Brian Barry). (shrink)

Nocebo effects occur when an adverse effect on the patient arises from the patient's own negative expectations. In accordance with informed consent, providers often disclose information that results in unintended adverse outcomes for the patient. While this may adhere to the principle of autonomy, it violates the doctrine of “primum non nocere,” given that side-effect disclosure may cause those side effects. In this article we build off previous work, particularly by Wells and Kaptchuk and by Cohen :3–11.[Taylor & (...) Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]), to suggest ethical guidelines that permit nondisclosure in the case when a nocebo effect is likely to occur on of the basis of nonmaleficence. We accept that that autonomy vis-à-vis informed consent must be forestalled, but salvage much of its role by elaborating a practical clinical approach to postencounter follow-up. In doing so, we reconcile a clinically practicable process of determining conditions of disclosure with long-standing ethical commitments to patients. (shrink)

From over 2000 years ago the ideal expressed in the Hippocratic Oath has encouraged doctors never knowingly to do harm: primum non nocere. Over 25 years ago the management writer Peter Drucker proposed it as the basis of a management ethic, ‘the right rule for the ethics managers need, the ethics of responsibility’.1 He argued then that the rule had wide scope encompassing for instance executive compensation, management rhetoric and the management of business impacts. In 2000 the United (...) Nations Global Compact embodied a Principle 7 enjoining ‘a precautionary approach to environmental challenges’ as defined in Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. But what can such precautionary injunctions mean in practice? And what of conflicts with other values? Robin Attfield lays out the key questions he argues need to be asked about the Precautionary Principle if it is to be taken seriously and acted upon soundly. His focus is on the management of vulnerable resources — specifically planetary ecosystems — with whose management knowingly or otherwise we are all concerned. (shrink)

Modern medicine is increasingly aware of the significance of patient autonomy in making treatment choices. This would seem to be particularly important where the therapy requested was "voluntary" as in fertility treatment or cosmetic surgery. However, the Hippocratic doctrine "Primum non nocere", seems especially relevant where the treatment sought may have a low chance of a successful outcome or even be life-threatening. Mrs A's case demonstrates the difficulty faced by the physician who wants to maximise her patient's autonomy, (...) but "Above all, do no harm". (shrink)

Is it ethical to perform a surgery whose purpose is to make a male look like a female or a female to appear male? Is it medically appropriate? Sexual reassignment surgery (SRS) violates basic medical and ethical principles and is therefore not ethically or medically appropriate. (1) SRS mutilates a healthy, non-diseased body. To perform surgery on a healthy body involves unnecessary risks; therefore, SRS violates the principle primum non nocere, “first, do no harm.” (2) Candidates for SRS (...) may believe that they are trapped in the bodies of the wrong sex and therefore desire or, more accurately, demand SRS; however, this belief is generated by a disordered perception of self. Such a fixed, irrational belief is appropriately described as a delusion. SRS, therefore, is a “category mistake”—it offers a surgical solution for psychological problems such as a failure to accept the goodness of one’s masculinity or femininity, lack of secure attachment relationships in childhood with same-sex peers or a parent, self-rejection, untreated gender identity disorder, addiction to masturbation and fantasy, poor body image, excessive anger, and severe psychopathology in a parent. (3) SRS does not accomplish what it claims to accomplish. It does not change a person’s sex; therefore, it provides no true benefit. (4) SRS is a “permanent,” effectively unchangeable, and often unsatisfying surgical attempt to change what may be only a temporary (i.e., psychotherapeutically changeable) psychological/psychiatric condition. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 9.1 (Spring2009): 97–125. (shrink)

The editorial in the September 1982 issue of this journal and many articles before and since have addressed the problem of informed consent. Is it possible? Is it a useful concept? Is there anything new to be said about it? In this article the basic rationale of the rule (patient autonomy) is explained and the extent of the rule explored. Various exceptions have been offered by the law and an attempt is made to catalogue the chief of these. A number (...) of specially vulnerable groups are then identified, the most important, and vexed, being children. How can informed consent be secured in the case of young patients? Finally, a few problems are mentioned in an attempt to get this subject back to reality. The appeal to the principle primum non nocere may be medical paternalism in disguise. Informed consent is the competing principle that reminds us of the primacy of human autonomy. A pointer is given to the future: even the use of sound recordings to explain medical procedures and to activate informed consent so that it may become a reality and not just a lawyer's myth, should be considered. (shrink)

As medical technology has advanced, the question of medical futility has become a topic of intense debate both within the medical community and within society as a whole. However, a unanimous definition thereof is yet to be decided—some commentators are sceptical as to whether an agreement will ever be reached—and this continues to lead to difficulties, tension, and even legal action when a treating physician disagrees with a patient and/or a patient’s family regarding care and treatment options. Although living in (...) a pluralistic society presents one of the major reasons as to why, despite 30 years of intense discussion, no consensus has been made; the issue of medical futility will always be complex as it is, by nature, multifaceted, and numerous elements—including possible risks, evidence of the probability of benefit, the wishes of the patient (and family), professional standards, and cost—interact. Nevertheless, the global medical community has seen the development of two distinctly different approaches to medical futility: one in which the autonomy of patients is of paramount importance in the decision whether or not to pursue a treatment; and one in which beneficence and primum non nocere—first do no harm—are almost entirely the clinician’s prerogative, and whereby he/she has a duty to refuse any treatment for which the potential risks outweigh the potential benefits for the patient. Recently, however, there has been a rejection of this dichotomous view of medical futility and the apparent “power struggle” between physician and patient, and a positive movement towards a more collaborative decision-making process that highlights the necessity of communication, aiming to result in the obtainment of the best possible outcome for each patient as an individual. (shrink)

Harm, this paper proposes, is a viable teaching objective. Presenting an andragogy of post secondary liberal arts education, this paper explores the relationship between critical thinking and subjective harm, arguing that subjective harm is an inevitable outcome of critical thinking practice. The author situates this teaching methodology within the discourse theory of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, positioning this critical thinking andragogy specifically within the Discourse of the Hysteric, which interrogates the institutionalized epistemology present in universities. Defining critical thinking as a subjective (...) cognitive technique adjoined to reflexivity and reflective practice, this paper examines and refutes the university principle of primum non nocere (do no harm), arguing that it represents a logical incoherence in university principles. Semantically and conceptually examining the terminologies involved, the author contends that, to the extent that we accept the definition of “harm” found in the Discourse of the University, any teaching practice that valorizes critical thinking inevitably will, and should, be harmful. (shrink)

As technology advances, and the life and death consequences of its failure become more and more removed from proximate human action, technology management requires greater degrees of ethical awareness and the management of safety becomes a matter of corporate ethical imperative. The corporate ethical imperative includes ethical mandates to take no action which places the lives of others at risk and to inform persons of dangers to their physical safety of which they may otherwise be unaware when one possesses information (...) relevant to the safety of others such that, with the possession of that knowledge, the others can make decisions relevant to protecting their safety, or if others fail to take such action, to take upon oneself the responsibility of taking such action. The ethical duty of primum non nocere implies the corresponding right of the life risking participant to be informed of the kind and degree of risk to which they are to be exposed and the freedom to refuse to take such risk without prejudice. The corporate ethical imperative is to hold human life precious and to uphold that imperative through selectively non-acting, properly informing and acting. The case of the Challenger disaster is utilised as an illustration of decision making which violated these ethical precepts. (shrink)

IntroductionIn the context of giving risk information for obtaining informed consent, it is not easy to comply with the ethical principle of “primum nihil nocere.” Carelessness, ignorance of nocebo effects and a misunderstood striving for legal certainty can lead doctors to comprehensive and brutal risk information. It is known that talking about risks and side effects can even trigger those and result in distress and nonadherence to medication or therapy.MethodsRecently, we have reported on significant clinically relevant effects of (...) verbal and non-verbal suggestions on maximal muscular arm strength in healthy volunteers and in patients at two time points before surgery. Maximal strength during arm abduction was measured by dynamometry of the deltoid muscle group. Suggestions from clinical everyday life were formulated as presumed negative and neutral versions.ResultsHere, we report on the effects of two versions of risk information in 45 patients. After sole mentioning risks of a puncture for the placement of a pain catheter, the maximal arm muscle strength was significantly reduced to 83% of baseline several days, and to 84% the evening before surgery. Strength was not significantly decreased and close to baseline at T1 and T2 when risks and benefits of a pain catheter were combined in one sentence. The difference between both versions was significant. With persistent normal distribution of values, the effect was due to uniform reactions of many patients, not to strong reactions of a few. High suggestibility and increase of anxiety with approaching surgery were identified as influencing factors for the neutralizing effect of modified wording.ConclusionWe not only suggest an alternative formulation for risk information to avoid nocebo effects but present an objective method to quantify and compare effects of different wordings. Thereby, we provide evidence that concurrently given positive aspects can neutralize negative effects during medical interview. (shrink)

Trisomy 18 is a condition with a very high mortality rate and the fetus usually dies in utero or shortly after birth. Parents are usually advised to terminate the pregnancy but in Liam's 1 situation the parents did not want this. They understood that the baby would not survive; however, they wanted to ensure that their baby had all the life that was possible, even in utero. The aim of this paper is to highlight how a lack of communication, inadequate (...) information, thoughtless words and actions resulted in a family experiencing preventable harm. Beneficence is a core value of health professionals; doing good is the foundation of care. However, in certain circumstances this value is challenged by the competing value of non-maleficence ; first, do no harm. The case of Liam is one such situation; the following is a brief discussion on some of the complex issues raised by this case. Medical ethicists often refer to the principle of primum nil nocere as finding a balance of benefits over harms of treatment. Beauchamp and Childress2 state that the obligation of non-maleficence is that one ought not to inflict harm.What was ‘harm’ in this situation? An invasion of rights without justifying useful consequences is one type of ethical harm. If we also take into consideration the Buddhist view of ethical harm where the concept of intentionality emerges, the intent behind clinical actions taken need to be considered. The case of Liam clearly demonstrates that the parents had the right to have compassionate care, understanding of their decisions and adequate information; confusion over these issues caused ethical harm as well as significant physical distress. In the situation of a non-viable pregnancy, it is the patient's value on life that matters not the health professional's. From the beginning …. (shrink)

Many medical students are fearful of voicing their concerns about ethically troubling medical practice. Yet they must speak up if they are to meet their responsibilities to patients, colleagues, and the profession of medicine.

In this essay, we focus on the moral justification of a highly controversial measure to redress medical brain drain: the duty to stay. We argue that the moral justification for this duty lies primarily in the fact that medical students impose high risks on their fellow citizens while receiving their medical training, which in turn gives them a reciprocity-based reason to temporarily prioritize the medical needs of their fellow citizens.

Although there are exceptions, the principle of primum nil nocere remains the cornerstone of the practice of medicine. In the well known handbook, Goodman and Gilman’s The Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics1 a case is presented which raises doubts about the permissibility of off-label administration of certain drugs to healthy troops as a preventive measure. The following citation from this handbook gives a clear description of the problem:"Prophylaxis in cholinesterase inhibitor poisoning. Studies in experimental animals have shown that pretreatment (...) with pyridostigmine reduces the incapacitation and mortality associated with “nerve agent” poisoning, particularly for agents, such as soman, that … ". (shrink)

In der modernen Medizin kommt es zunehmend zu Entscheidungskonflikten zwischen Intervention und Interventionsverzicht dort, wo nicht die medizinisch-technischen Möglichkeiten handlungsleitend sein sollen, sondern die am individuellen Patientenwohl sich orientierende bioethische Prognose entsprechend den klassischen arztethischen Prinzipien des primum nil nocere und des salus aegroti suprema lex. Schadensverbot und Heilauftrag sollen nicht heteronom und uniform vorgegeben werden, sondern sich am Willen des Patienten orientieren. Nicht selten macht jedoch die Ermittlung des mutmaßlichen Patientenwillens große Schwierigkeiten, vor allem bei Demenz, Koma, (...) schwerem Trauma und Multimorbidität in der Nähe des Todes. Vorsorgliche Betreuungsvollmachten und Behandlungsverfügungen, fälschlich oft 'Patiententestament' genannt, sind als Instrumente für stellvertretende Entscheidungen und zur Ermittlung des Patientenwohles in solchen Situationen vorgeschlagen worden. Der Beitrag analysiert die entscheidungstheoretischen, ethischen, rechtlichen und medizinischen Aspekte prospektiver Entscheidung über eine medizinische Behandlung in einem transkulturellen und interdisziplinären Vergleich von Entscheidungen und Diskussionen in den USA, Japan und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Es werden verschiedene Modelle und Betreuungsverfügungen mit unterschiedlicher rechtlicher und medizinischer Validität und Präzision sowie unterschiedlicher kultureller und individueller Akzeptanz entwickelt und diskutiert. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DOES GOD HAVE A QUIDDITY ACCORDING TO AVICENNA* IN THE NEW critical edition of Avicenna's MemphyS'ics by S. Van Riet at Louvain (I, 1977; II, 1980; III, 1983), Gerard Verbeke states that according to Avicenna, "L'Etre necessaire n'a pas une essence qui est distincte de son existence" (II, p. * 42, at note 159), i.e. that the Necessary Being does not have an essence that is distinct from its (...) existence. One looks in vain for a precise reference to an Avicennian text. On the other hand, in a three-part study, Albert G. Judy, O.P., "Avicenna's Me1taphy8'ics in the Summa contra Gentiles," published in Angelicum, part I: 52 (1975) 340-384; part II: 541-586; part Ill: 53 (1976) 183-226, states quite clearly that the "First" does not have a quiddity but only an "anity" (anitas)... (546), and that Avicenna... finds that the absolutely necessary being cannot have what every other reality has, namely, a quiddity, a "whatness " distinct from its" whether-ness" or anitas (547-548). Moreover, the first appendix of Judy's article contains a redaction of the 1495 and the 1508 Venice editions of ltletaphyiscs 8.4, which differs chiefly in punctuation from the excellent Van Riet text based on five Latin MSS. A slightly more nuanced position is. found in Etienne Gilson's Elements of Christian Philosoph;y (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 127: "... such exactly had been the con- * Delivered before the Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science meeting in conjunction with The American Catholic Philosophical Association in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on April 12, 1985. 79 80 E. M. MACIEROWSKI clusion of Avicenna: the first has no quiddity (quidditatem non habet)," a claim that cites (305, note 28) secondary literature which one can trace as far back as Father M.-D. RolandGosselin 's edition of the De ente et essentia. What is at stake in this dispute? What if God does not have a quiddity? It would seem that He should be utterly unknowable, if quiddity or essence is a principle of knowledge as well as of being. Such would be plausible consequences of Gilson's and Judy's position. What, on the other hand, if God does have a quiddity? One possible inference, if we happened to have access or insight into the divine quiddity, is that we could have a sort of mystical union with God, perhaps even in this life; or again, one might draw pantheistic conclusions. Verbeke does not follow such paths. His inference points toward a rawrochement between Avicenna's doctrine and that of St. Thomas Aquinas, who maintained not only that God is His own essence (and therefore that it is reasonable to speak of a divine essence) but also that God's essence is no other than His esse, His being or existence. Accordingly, for scholars to have such opposed views about so important a topic even at the hermeneutical level of Avicenna's position points to a serious difficulty. Since Judy does offer texts in support of his interpretation, let us consider the evidence, using his section numbers and Van Riet's pages and lines: Judy, section 4=Van Riet 398.83-399.84 goes thus in Latin: Redibo igitur et dicam quod primum non habet quidditatem, nisi anitatem, quae sit discreta ab ipsa. This text he renders, "The first does not have a quiddity, except an 'anity,' which is distinct from it" (549). The other text in Latin (Judy, section 13=Van Riet 401.31-32) goes thus: Igitur necesse esse non habet quidditatem nisi quod est necesse esse, et haec est anitas, which he renders, "Therefore necessary being does not have a quiddity, but only the fact of its necessary being, and this is DOES GOD HAVE A QUIDDITY ACCORDING TO AVICENNA 81 'anity'" (559). We wonder, however, why nisi should be translated "except" in section 4 and "hut only" in section 13. One would have expected a sed solum or a sed tantum to justify the rendering "but only." Accordingly, the translation should be corrected to read, " Therefore the necessary being has no quiddity except that it is necessary being, and this... (shrink)

Nicholas of Autrecourt maintains in his second letter to Bernard of Arezzo that with the exception of the certitude of faith, there is no other certitude but the certitude of the law of non-contradiction, or the one that can be resolved to this law. The article examines this statement, which implies that natural theology is not possible. It comes to the conclusion that, in general, Nicholas in his letter seems to identify the relation "…can be resolved…" between two certain sentences (...) with the relation "…follows from…". This identification leads to problems which are discussed. Further, Nicholas says that in every valid inference the consequent is identical with the antecedent or is part of it. This can be understood in two ways. (shrink)

Excerpt from Caroli Lachmanni in T. Lucretii Cari De Rerum Natura Libros Commentarius Iterum Editus Itaque recensendi mnnere ita functus sum nt quod Gumque bonum et verum esset'aut in utroque aut in alter utro codice id sine ullo dubitationis indicio exhiberem ver suum autem erdinem eum quo essent a veteribus librariis scripti, numeris appositis indicarem: emendafionem his re bus contineri arbitratus sum primum ut versus a. Librariis traiecti in suum locum reducerentur; quod ubi evenit nu meri sese naturali ordine (...) excipere non petuerunt: deinde nt ipsa versuum vocabula ubi vel perissent vel depravata es sent, quantum fieri posset, reciperarentur, ita tamen nt sin gula ad codicum fidemscripta cum singnlis commentariernm particulis praefigerentur, tum in imis paginis carminum enn merarentur. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Excerpt from M. Tulli Ciceronis De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum Libri Quinque Duo sunt, opinor, quae lectures a me hoc loco requi rent aut, si non requirent ipsi, rogandi mihi sunt, ut beneuolo animo et adtento accipiaut. Nam primum di ccudam st de horum librorum, quos Cicero de finibus honorum et maiorum scripsit, emendatiolle et enarratione et nninersae opera a me in iis positm ratio sic expli canda, ut, qua in commentariis disperse posita sunt, ea ad suas canssas generation (...) reuocata et intellegi plenius et indicari rectius possint. Quo loco etiam illud ecli cere conabor, ut libertas quaedam et simplicitas indici et orationis, a qua ne hic quidem discedam, merito et necessario adhibita esse uideatur. Deiude, qum de Cice roniani operis forma atque descriptione ncitu digna ui debuntur neque in commentariis aut per excursus carpo sita, conprehendam et ab iis ad ipsos libros lectores nittam. Sed prior illa disputatio, cuius magna pars ad paratns critici ex;>licatione continebitur, quem sua na tura maiorem necessitatem habent quam delectationem in rebus minutis per ambages persequendis, tum molestior fit, quod plus uerhorum consumendum et in eorum co dicum conmemoratione, quos parum nouimus, quam in eorum, quorum plenus asus concessus est. Itaque de precor, ne mea existumetur culpa, qua superiorum st. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

nil nisi lasciui per me discuntur amores:femina praecipiam quo sit amanda modo.femina nec flammas nec saeuos discutit arcus;parcius haec uideo tela nocere uiris.It was pointed out in 1992 by E.J. Kenney that femina in line 28 ‘sabotages the poet's … disclaimer’ that it is not women generally but ‘only those not ruled out of bounds by stola and uittae’ who are to benefit from his instruction. He suggests instead that, since what is wanted is a variation on the previous (...) line, one should read nec proba, or, as a better possibility, non proba. Kenney's objection to femina is accepted by Roland Mayer, in a note published the following year. After observing, however, that, ‘when a word has intruded itself from a nearby line and expelled the authentic reading, the ductus litterarum is no guide to emendation’, and that bold measures are therefore admissible, Mayer proposes Thais, comparing Rem. am. 385–6 Thais in arte mea est: lasciuia libera nostra est; | nil mihi cum uitta; Thais in arte mea est. Later, W.S. Watt suggested talis, viz. lasciua, noting talis at 142 and talem at 157. None of these suggestions is entirely compelling, however, and Gibson is therefore right just to obelize femina in his edition; but he also points out in the commentary ad loc. the ‘greater oddity’ relating to amanda, asking ‘Should Ovid not be declaring his intention to teach women how to love, rather than declaring that he will teach how they should be loved?’ and even going so far as to suggest that the whole pentameter is fundamentally corrupt and should be obelized. (shrink)

«Theologicis et Philosophicis doctrinis, ex ipsa Iuris et lustititiae, nec non Prudentiae, aliarumque Virtutum Moralium Natura desumptis, compendiario illustratus et sub auspiciis lUustrissimi Domini D. Georgii de Lubomir L U B O M I R S K I, Comitis in Visnicz et Jaroslaw: Poloniarum Archimarschalci, et Regni Exercituum Ducis, nec non Generalis Cracoviae: et Casimiriensis, Olstinensis, Chmielnicensis, Nizinensis etc. etc. Capitanei. Publicae Disputantium concertationi propositus ab Alexandro J a s k m a n i c k i, sacrae Theologiae auditore. (...) In Cardinalitio Hosiano Collegio Societatis Jesu. Anno ab Homine Deo nato. M.DC.LXIV [1664]. Brunsbergae, Typis Henrici Schultz». En habes, Benevolo Lector, plenum titulum libri, qui hie nostram movet attentionem. Primum Auctoris biographia traditur, deinde de eiusdem operis dedicatione sermo est, postea vero ipsa eins politica et socialis doctrina explicatur et commentatur. (shrink)

The first point that Tacitus makes is the confusion that surrounded these elections. Tiberius' policy was in no way as well denned here as it apparently was in the case of the praetorship elections: De comitiis consularibus, quae turn primum illo principe ac deinceps fuere, vix quicquam firmare ausim: adeo diversa non modo apud auctores, sed in ipsius orationibus reperiuntur.

There is an obvious paradox in any attempt to map the topography of Paradise, for Paradise, theologians assure us, is outside of space as well as time. Yet mapping Paradise is what Dante's poem, the Paradiso, attempts to do. For the two preceding realms of the afterlife, hell and purgatory, Dante provides numerous finely articulated descriptions of rigorously ordered regions. And again for Paradise, the variegated states of the souls making up the spiritual order of the realm are expressed very (...) precisely by a topographical scheme, one in this case based on Ptolemy's system of the heavens. The seven planetary spheres are followed by the sphere of the fixed stars and the primum mobile, the whole finally bordering on the completely nonspatial heaven of the Empyrean. But this last “sphere” alone is Paradise in the full and strict sense. As Dante has Beatrice explain in canto 4.28–48, the whole poem attempts to describe this totally nonspatial order in terms of the array of the nine physical heavens as metaphorical correlatives for the successive degrees of beatitude experienced by the souls “in” the Empyrean. Paradise in this sense—as the Empyrean—is thus utopic, if any place is: it is literally “no place” at all. (shrink)

On a postcard to Franz Overbeck from January 4, 1888, Nietzsche makes some illuminating remarks with respect to the three treatises in his book On the Genealogy of Morality.2 Nietzsche says that, ‘for the sake of clarity, it was necessary artificially to isolate the different roots of that complex structure that is called morality. Each of these three treatises expresses a single primum mobile; a fourth and fifth are missing, as is even the most essential (‘the herd instinct’) – (...) for the time being, the latter had to be ignored, as too comprehensive, and the same holds for the ultimate summation of all those different elements and thus a final account of morality.’ Nietzsche also points out that each treatise makes a contribution to the genesis of Christianity and rejects an explanation of Christianity in terms of only one psychological category. The topics of the treatises are ‘good’ and ‘evil’ (first treatise), the ‘bad conscience’ (second), and the ‘ascetic ideal’ (third). The postcard suggests that Nietzsche discusses these topics separately because a joint treatment is too complicated, but that in reality, these ideas are inextricably intertwined, both with each other and with others that Nietzsche omits. Therefore, the three treatises should be regarded as parts of a unified theory and critique of morality. Nietzsche’s remarks on that postcard are important because in the Genealogy itself, he makes little effort to show the unity among the treatises. We shall return to this postcard repeatedly.3 The first treatise has attracted most scholarly attention, but much less work has been done on the second treatise, ‘ “Debts”, “Bad Conscience”, and Related Matters’. This is unfortunate, since it seems that, in Nietzsche’s own view, the central notion of the second treatise, namely, the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt, is a key element of Christian morality. Therefore, understanding Nietzsche’s treatment of this notion is essential to understanding his views on Christianity and the impact of the Christian heritage on non-religious moral philosophy.. (shrink)

In February 54b.c. Cicero concludes a missive to his brother with a passing and – for us – tantalizing remark:Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis. sed cum veneris. virum te putabo si Sallusti Empedoclea legeris; hominem non putabo. Quintus had, it seems, readDe rerum natura, or at least parts thereof, just before he left Rome for an undisclosed location nearby, and he shared his enthusiasm with his brotherper codicillos. Meanwhile, he was corresponding with Julius (...) Caesar, whose staff in Gaul he was about to join. When, a few months later, he was stationed with Caesar, he was involved in another literary affair, this time concerning his brother who wrote to him, inquiring about his autobiographicalDe temporibus suis:quo modo nam, mi frater, de nostris versibus Caesar? nam primum librum se legisse scripsit ad me ante, et prima sic ut neget se ne Graeca quidem meliora legisse; reliqua ad quendam locum ῥᾳθυμότερα (hoc enim utitur verbo). dic mihi verum: num aut res eum aut χαρακτὴρ non delectat?(Q.fr.2.15.5). (shrink)

«Theologicis et Philosophicis doctrinis, ex ipsa Iuris et lustititiae, nec non Prudentiae, aliarumque Virtutum Moralium Natura desumptis, compendiario illustratus et sub auspiciis lUustrissimi Domini D. Georgii de Lubomir L U B O M I R S K I, Comitis in Visnicz et Jaroslaw: Poloniarum Archimarschalci, et Regni Exercituum Ducis, nec non Generalis Cracoviae: et Casimiriensis, Olstinensis, Chmielnicensis, Nizinensis etc. etc. Capitanei. Publicae Disputantium concertationi propositus ab Alexandro J a s k m a n i c k i, sacrae Theologiae auditore. (...) In Cardinalitio Hosiano Collegio Societatis Jesu. Anno ab Homine Deo nato. M.DC.LXIV [1664]. Brunsbergae, Typis Henrici Schultz». En habes, Benevolo Lector, plenum titulum libri, qui hie nostram movet attentionem. Primum Auctoris biographia traditur, deinde de eiusdem operis dedicatione sermo est, postea vero ipsa eins politica et socialis doctrina explicatur et commentatur. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS'S FOURTH WAY AND THE APPROXIMATING RELATION HERE IS, IT CAN BE SAID, at least one troubleome premise (to some, unacceptable) in each of the Five Ways recorded by Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae (S.T., I, q.2, a.3, c.). Three of the W·ays, i.e., the First and the Second and the Fifth, have a premise which describes God-Prime Mover (Primum Movens, quod a nullo movetur), First Efficient Cause (...) (Causa Efficiens Prima), Intelligent Orderer (Aliquid Intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur in finem), respectively-in a way which falls short of a proper or adequate (unmistakable, unquestionable, unique) identification of God. That is, it is not necessary that the Prime Mover be God, or that the First Efficient Cause be God, or that the Intelligent Orderer be God. For, whatever else God is, God is the Creator, and the Prime Mover is not. And neither is the First Efficient Cause; nor is the Intelligent Orderer. This happens because the empirical point of departure of each of these three Ways gives the causality of the Prime Mover, of the First Efficient Cause, and of the Intelligent Orderer an effect and a scope which make it impossible to identify them with the effect and the scope of the causality of the Creator. The two remaining ways, though providing a description of God which quite properly or adequately identifies God-SelfNecessary Being (Ens per se necessarium), Most a Being (Maxime Ens), respectively-make an analytic claim which is troublesome (to some unacceptable), in any case difficult to understand. In the Third Way, it is the analytic claim that "... si... omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus;" and in the Fourth Way, it is the analytic claim that 17 18 JOSEPH BOBIK ". [si]... magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est...,... est... aliquid quod est verissimum et optimum et nobilissimum... et... maxime ens." There are three parts in the argument of the Fourth Way,1 and it is the first of these which is difficult to understand. The first part moves from the observed existence of the more and the less good, true, noble, etc. to the concluded existence of the most good, true, noble, etc.-the simpliciter good, true, noble, etc., as it is called in the Contra Gentiles formul,ation of an argument (S.G., I, cap. 13) which is similar to (though also quite different from) the Fourth Way of the Summa Theologiae.2 The second part argues that the most true or verissimum 1 It will be of help to the reader to have the text of the Fourth Way in hand, and to have its three parts explicitly distinguished. Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. First part: Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile: et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est: sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum et optimum et nobilissimum, Second part: et per consequens maxime ens: nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Third part: Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis: sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc dicimus Deum. 2 Whereas the Fourth Way uses the approximating relation to move to the existence of the Maxime Ens from the fact that there are real things which are more and less, the way of the G.G. uses the approximating relation to move to the existence of the Maxime Ens from the fact that there are propositions such that one is more false than the other (and so, less true than the other) more puzzling still than the Fourth Way. Here is the text of the G.G. argument: Potest etiam alia ratio colligi ex verbis Aristotelis. In II enim Metaphys. ostendit quod ea quae sunt maxime vera, sunt et... (shrink)

Cet ouvrage organise a la maniere pedagogique d'un cours propose une lecture systematique de La Metaphysique d'Aristote a la lumiere des commentaires de la tradition thomiste. La metaphysique, dite philosophie premiere, a pour objet la science des premiers principes et des premieres causes. L'ensemble des huit lecons proposees ici explicite, analyse et critique les concepts majeurs de la metaphysique: etant, essence et etre (esse), substance et accidents, matiere et forme, etc., puis les causes de l'etre ainsi que les principes de (...) l'activite rationnelle: non-contradiction, causalite. Au terme de cette etude, l'intelligence, parvenue au terme de son effort d'analyse, est ainsi conduite a l'affirmation rationnelle de la premiere cause et du premier etant (primum ens), celui qu'on appelle Dieu. Veritable traite, cet ouvrage offre au lecteur toutes les cles de lecture de la metaphysique realiste. La soeur Louise-Marie Antoniotti (decedee en juillet 2012) etait moniale dominicaine a Paray-le-Monial. Agregee de philosophie et lecteur en theologie, elle a collabore a la Revue thomiste et enseigne la theologie au Service monastique d'etudes theologiques. (shrink)

‘Ergo abolendo rumori Nero subdidit reos et quaesitissimis poenis adfecit quos per flagitia invisos vulgus Christianos appellabat. auctor nominis eius Christus Tiberio imperitante per procuratorem Pontium Pilatum supplicio adfectus erat; repressaque in praesens exitiabilis superstitio rursum erumpebat, non modo per Iudaeam, originem eius mali, sed per urbem etiam quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluuunt celebranturque. igitur primum correpti qui fatebantur deinde indicio eorum multitudo ingens haud proinde in crimine incendii quam odio humani generis convicti sunt. et pereuntibus addita (...) ludibria, ut ferarum tergis contecti laniatu canum interirent, aut crucibus adfixi aut flammandi, atque ubi defecisset dies in usum nocturni luminis urerentur. hortos suos ei spectaculo Nero obtulerat et circense ludicrum edebat, habitu aurigae permixtus plebi vel curriculo insistens. unde quamquam adversus sontes et novissima exempla meritos miseratio oriebatur, tamquam non utilitate publica sed in saevitiam unius absumerentur.’ Tac.Ann. 15. 44. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:[Quaestio prima: quomodo est anima omnia]“Anima quodammodo est omnia.”2Verbum Philosophi est et abbreviatum; non autem omnibus satis manifestum. Quid me, Vir Dei,3 iam sollicitas in isto? Scis enim quod imperitussum scientia, et iste sermo profunda forte indiget exquisitione. Quaeris ergo specificari tibi illud quod dico ‘quodammodo’; quomodo enim erit anima omnia? Istum modum velles tibi specificari: autin summa dictione una, aut secundum singula entia singulos modos explicare.Videtur ergo ipse (...) Philosophus declarare istam propositionem inductive sic:‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia, intellectus est quodammodo intelligibilia’,4igitur etc.[Obiectiones]Hic statim duo obicis:Primum quod cum anima tres partes habeat – vegetativam, sensitivam,intellectivam – in hac ostensione Philosophi ipsum vegetativum nulli entium attribuitur per quodammodo essendi idem, ergo videtur quod non debeatdicere: anima simpliciter quodammodo est omnia, sed secundum aliquas parteseius solum.Item, videtur quod debeat dici quod solum intellectivum sit quodammmodo omnia; nam omnia omnino sunt intelligibilia: universalia, singularia. Omnes naturae vere et simpliciter intelligibiles sunt quantum in ipsis est, licet prima et remotissima principia a nobis non intelligantur. Defectus enim in nobis est sicut in oculis vespertilionis, quibus non videt solem.[2] Item, quomodo est sensus ipsa sensibilia et intellectus ipsa intelligibilia?Aeque enim ignotae sunt hae assumptiones sicut et conclusio. Nam sensitivum res vivens est et substantia; sensibilia, res non-viventes et accidentia, qualitates de tertia specie qualitatis.5 Quomodo ergo est haec illa? Iam enim patet quod non conveniunt nisi in esse et ente tantum; in nullo enim genereomnino. Igitur videtur quod nihil sit dictu ‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia’.Nam multo magis proprie et vere dictum videretur si diceret quis ‘homoquodammodo est asinus’, nam haec conveniunt in genere et generibus.Similiter, quaeris ex parte intellectus et intelligibilium. Intelligibilia enimsunt et substantiae et accidentia, et res viventes et non-viventes; ipsum autem intellectivum, solum substantia et res vivens.[Prima responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: Sensus est in potentia tale quale sensibile in actu]6Vir Dei, dices mihi, colligendo ex ipso eodem auctore, et respondebis |A 281vb| mihi cum quaero: sensus quomodo est ipsum sensibile? Respondebis cum Philosopho, quia hoc modo, scilicet quod ‘sensus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum sensibile in actu’,7 et illud pertractabis ad singulos sensus et sensibilia. Sic visus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum visibile in actu, et ita de aliis.Sed ego contra: Vir Dei, si ‘sensus est in potentia tale etc.’, ergo aliquando erit in actu tale, etc.Ad idem: sentire quoddam pati est et quaedam alteratio. Est enim sensus de genere virtutum passivarum secundum eundem Philosophum.8 Agens autem et patiens in principio sunt dissimilia; in fine vero, cum passum est, sunt similia.Igitur sensitivum ex quo sentiendo quodammodo patitur et passivum est. Infine cum passum est, simile erit ipsi activo, scilicet sensibili. Tunc igitur erit‘sensus tale in actu quale est etiam ipsum sensibile in actu’.Sed nunc quaero quid hoc sit dictu, scilicet quod aliquando ipsum sensitivum in actu sit tale quale ipsum sensibile. Quid dicis ‘tale quale’? Numquid si actu video colorem, est virtus visiva oculi mei actu color? Aut non dicis talis estcolor? Quaero, si in qualitate assimilabitur illa virtus visiva actu colori, nihil videtur huiusmodi expositio. |E 107vb| Sicut enim superius dictum est, non videntur convenire nisi in solo ente et esse.9Confiteor, Vir Dei, quia haec ultimo obiecta tentativa sunt, sed necessaria tamen ad propositum si recte dissolvantur, per gratiam ergo Dei et per orationes tuas, Vir Dei, spero ad haec quandoque redire.[Secunda responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: homo ut mundus minor]Sed nec illud quod legimus videtur sufficere ad propositum problema, Vir Dei: ‘homo est quodammodo omnis creatura et mundus’, minor scilicet,10 et communicans cum omnibus creaturis, hoc modo: “esse cum lapidibus, vivere cum plantis, sentire cum brutis, intelligere cum angelis,” et tandem cum Deo.11Si secundum hunc modum velim praedictum sermonem exponere, non erit.. (shrink)

Buddhist concepts of personal life and responsibilities.